© 2025 Modern ANCSA Project. All rights reserved
Independent, informational, and not affiliated with any ANCSA corporation.
Independent, informational, and not affiliated with any ANCSA corporation.
This timeline traces the legal, structural, and governance decisions that shaped Alaska Native Corporations—across eras, court decisions, and systemic patterns that continue to affect shareholders today.
Alaska became a U.S. state without resolving Aboriginal land claims, leaving Indigenous land ownership legally undefined.
Federal and state governments sought legal certainty over Alaska land to enable large-scale resource development.
Alaska Native leaders organized politically to demand resolution of land claims.
The discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay intensified pressure to resolve land claims quickly.
The proposed trans-Alaska pipeline could not proceed without resolving Native land claims.
The discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay created immediate pressure to resolve Alaska Native land claims in order to unlock pipeline development.
Federal negotiators centered “extinguishment of aboriginal title” as the legal foundation of the settlement.
ANCSA deliberately established state-chartered corporations rather than tribal or trust-based governance structures.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) established a corporate-based land and compensation framework in exchange for the extinguishment of Aboriginal land claims in Alaska.
ANCSA established a closed shareholder system tied to enrollment status at the time of enactment.
ANCSA divided assets and authority between regional and village corporations, creating layered governance.
ANCSA was framed as a comprehensive, final resolution to Native land claims.
Dozens of corporations were formed almost immediately following ANCSA’s passage, often without prior corporate experience.
Shares were issued to eligible Alaska Natives, often without clear explanation of corporate rights or limitations.
Village and regional corporations were required to select lands within rigid deadlines and limited data environments.
Early tension emerged between immediate shareholder distributions and long-term corporate investment.
Corporations increasingly relied on non-Native professional managers to operate complex enterprises.
Disagreements emerged over the limits of board authority and shareholder influence.
Traditional expectations of collective stewardship clashed with Western corporate fiduciary models.
P.L. 94-204, 89 Stat. 1145, January 2, 1976
It became clear that ANCSA required ongoing interpretation, adjustment, and supplemental governance.
The ANCSA was passed in 1971 to provide a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (a). The settlement provided the Natives with nearly one billion dollars and 40 million acres of land in Alaska. Under the Act the twelve Regional Corporations and a multitude of Village Corporations are given the right to select land from the public domain. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1611 and 1613(h). As part of this land selection and conveyancing process the Act provides that the Secretary of the Interior shall reserve public easements upon the lands selected prior to granting the patents. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b)(3). It is the scope of this authority as well as the Secretary’s authority to reserve easements pursuant to other Acts upon lands patented under the ANCSA which is questioned herein. The court first will consider the Secretary’s authority to reserve easements under the ANCSA.
Boards transitioned from provisional stewards to entrenched centers of authority.
The purpose of the Claims Act is to settle equitably the aboriginal claims made by Alaska Natives through a combination grant of land and money. Twelve Regional and 220 Village Corporations have been organized to represent Natives in geographic areas and to manage the property and funds received from the federal government.[1]
Judges: James A. von der Heydt, United States District Judge.
Shareholder engagement narrowed largely to elections and annual meetings.
As a part of the settlement of the aboriginal claims of Alaska�s Natives, Congress required that a regional corporation, authorized by ANCSA, receiving revenues from certain sources of wealth share those revenues with its sister corporations. Section 7(i) provides:
Executive management gained significant operational autonomy.
Pursuant to the provisions of ANCSA, the United States has conveyed certain federal lands covered by the Act to Alaskan native corporations. Appellants are three miners, two of whom have valid mining claims on land that was conveyed to native corporations, and one who appears to have a mining claim on land not conveyed. The action was originally brought as a class action. Class certification was denied by the district court.
Located approximately 3000 feet to the south of Seagull Lake is a cannery owned by appellee, Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. The cannery draws 400,000 gallons of water per day from the lake, through a 10-inch pipeline constructed in 1930 by the Red Salmon Canning Company, one of Wards Cove’s predecessors in interest. On August 1, 1936, and again on January 17, 1959, the predecessors recorded with the United States Commissioner, Kvichak District at Naknek, Alaska, a Notice of Appropriation of Water Rights, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 661.[2] Also in January of 1959, a predecessor filed an application with the Department of the Interior for rights of way for a reservoir, a pipeline, a pumping plant, and a transmission line needed in order to take the water. This was granted in May of 1963 and included a 50 foot wide strip around the lake. Wards Cove filed a Declaration of Appropriation with the Alaska Division of Lands, Department of Natural Resources, on August 24, 1967, declaring the appropriation of water for “cannery operation, domestic use and fire protection.”[3] There have been no competing declarations seeking to use the waters of Seagull Lake.
The district court held that the action was barred by 43 U.S.C. § 1609(a),[2] which places time, venue, and party restrictions on actions challenging the constitutionality of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (“ANCSA”). The court concluded that although the party restriction, limiting challenges to those filed by an authorized official of the State of Alaska, was “of doubtful constitutionality,” the time and venue provisions independently disallowed the action. We affirm.
Courts increasingly became arbiters of internal corporate disputes.
Traditional advisory and cultural influence mechanisms declined in formal relevance.
Procedural compliance increasingly substituted for substantive accountability.
Corporations reached structural stability, reducing appetite for reform.
ANILCA created a massive federal land framework and embedded a rural subsistence priority on federal public lands.
The subsistence priority was structured around “rural” residency rather than tribal citizenship.
P.L. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, December 2. 1980
A persistent jurisdiction split formed: state management in some places, federal control in others.
The Federal Subsistence Board was established to manage subsistence on federal public lands.
Federal agency processes increasingly governed access and outcomes across rural Alaska.
Subsistence increasingly operated through rules, eligibility criteria, and enforcement.
Local advisory councils were created to provide community input into federal subsistence decisions.
Defining “rural” becomes a flashpoint with political and cultural consequences.
ANILCA’s conservation units expanded the scope of federal land management across Alaska.
Alaska’s attempt to implement ANILCA’s rural priority collides with state constitutional interpretations.
People increasingly struggle to distinguish between ANCSA corporate lands and federally managed lands.
After segregation, the occupied areas of the townsite were subdivided by the United States into blocks, lots, streets, alleys, and municipal public reservations. Lots owned by non-natives paid an assessment for the survey. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2565.3(a), (b) (1970). Other areas of the townsite remained unsubdivided until occupied. Following subdivision, the Secretary issued patents for the land, allowing the trustee to issue deeds to occupants after payment of any purchase price or assessments. The date of the subdivision survey was the last day for new claims within the subdivision. 43 C.F.R. § 2565.3(c) (1970). Once the subdivision survey was complete, all unclaimed lots could be sold by the trustee at a public sale. 43 C.F.R. § 2565.5 (1970). Proceeds of sales went to the municipality. All unsold lots were deeded to the municipality, a provision which is of central importance in this case. 43 C.F.R. § 2565.7 (1970). After all lands within the townsite trust were progressively subdivided and distributed, the townsite trust terminated. Thus, the distribution process had two major steps. The first step was the segregation, which set aside the townsite. The second step was subdivision, which led to distribution and conveyances of the land.
ANCSA’s primary purpose is to provide a “fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims.” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a). Accordingly, each of the twelve regions has been subdivided into villages, and the Alaska Native Village Corporations (Village Corporations) have been established. 43 U.S.C. § 1607.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was enacted into law “to provide an equitable solution to the claims made by the Natives of Alaska through a combination of land and money.” H.R. 92-523, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2192, 2193. Under ANCSA, the surface estate in some 22 million acres of land was patented to village corporations such as Tyonek. The subsurface estate in those same lands was patented to regional corporations such as Cook Inlet. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613. Lands so divided are referred to as the “dually owned lands.” Another 16 million acres, the “fee lands,” were patented in their entirety to regional corporations, but those corporations are required to distribute most of the revenues from the subsurface estate among all the regional corporations in Alaska. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j).
While corporations had limited control over subsistence outcomes, they increasingly absorbed community frustration.
It becomes clear that federal subsistence law and Alaska’s constitution are structurally misaligned.
Legal outcomes increasingly diverge from cultural expectations and lived realities.
P.L. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1789, February 3, 1988
Subsistence governance operates through carve-outs, exceptions, and special rules.
A major Alaska Supreme Court decision undermined the state’s ability to run a rural subsistence priority.
When the state could not comply with ANILCA’s rural priority, federal management expanded on federal lands.
By the end of this era, governance outcomes were legally defined—but legitimacy was fractured.
By 1990, overlapping legal systems were no longer transitional—they were permanent.
Congress acknowledged that ANCSA corporations were no longer transitional entities but enduring institutions.
Federal oversight receded as corporations were expected to self-regulate responsibly.
Despite permanence, shareholder participation mechanisms were not meaningfully expanded.
Extension of a timber sales contract that was in existence at time village corporation selected affected land for conveyance did not amount to an unconstitutional taking since title had not yet been conveyed. The United States did not have a fiduciary obligation regarding management of selected land.
For at least the last 30 years, George Kitchen has made a living as an air taxi pilot and hunting guide. In the fall of 1967, Kitchen began professionally guiding in the Canoe Bay area of the Alaska Peninsula, roughly halfway between the Bering Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Kitchen and his clients hunt predominantly brown bear and some caribou in this area. In 1969, Kitchen erected a prefabricated metal structure on the Canoe Bay site to serve as the base camp for his bear hunting operations. In his deposition, Kitchen described it as ten feet by twelve feet, a garage type deal made out of more of a plastic than metal, with no windows. After bears and strong winds tore down the structure, Kitchen re-erected similar prefabricated metal structures in 1970 and again in 1971 or 1972.
Congress amended ANCSA to eliminate sunset assumptions and formalize long-term corporate continuity.
Congress clarified rules governing share transfer, inheritance, and long-term ownership.
ANCSA corporations were reaffirmed as entities governed primarily by state corporate law.
Corporations pursued more aggressive growth strategies following confirmation of permanence.
Congress reaffirmed ANCSA’s finality while entrenching its governance framework.
By the end of the 1980s, cultural expectations and legal governance models no longer aligned.
The facts are not disputed. The Gulkana River System (“the River” or “the Gulkana”) is composed of clear water streams located in south central Alaska. The River flows through diverse lands containing tundra, spruce forests, and lakes. It displaces 3,600 to 4,800 cubic feet per second from May to September, decreasing to 200 to 300 cubic feet per second from November through April, when the River lies frozen. The parties stipulate that the physical characteristics of the River, such as water volume, gradients, geology, and general weather, are the same as they were when Alaska became a State in 1959.
Design assumptions made under urgency became permanent governance constraints.
ANCSA corporations accelerated expansion beyond Alaska following confirmation of permanence.
In 1976 the Grouse Creek Corporation applied as a Native group for a conveyance of 6720 acres of National Forest land.[1]�Under the applicable regulations, a group qualifies as a Native group only if a majority of the residents of the locality are members. The Bureau of Indian Affairs found that the Grouse Creek group did not qualify: Only eleven of thirty-one residents were members of the Grouse Creek group. The Grouse Creek group appealed, and the administrative law judge redrew the boundaries of the locality. Nonetheless, he found that the Grouse Creek group fell just short of meeting the majority requirement even within the new boundaries: Fifteen of thirty residents were members. Because less than a majority of the residents of the locality were members of the Grouse Creek group, it did not qualify as a Native group.
Lease issued by state prior to ANCSA on tentatively approved land that had option to purchase was a "valid existing right" that is excluded from Native corporation withdrawal and selection under ANCSA 11(a)(1) and (2).
*** Edward Spang is substituted for Michael J. Penfold as Alaska State Director of the Bureau of Land Management pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1).
Executive roles became specialized, competitive, and externally recruited.
In January 1980, the Forest Service transferred administration of the special use permits to Kavilco pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g). Kavilco chose to administer the permits by sending new lease agreements to the permittees. These lease agreements increased the permittees’ rent. Buettner and Hamar refused to sign the new leases and instead sent Kavilco checks for the amounts required by the special use permits. Kavilco rejected the checks and unsuccessfully attempted forcible entry and detainer proceedings against Buettner and Hamar. On January 25, 1983, Buettner and Hamar commenced a quiet title action in Alaska state court. Kavilco removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kavilco. Buettner and Hamar appeal.
In enacting ANCSA, Congress declared as a policy that “the settlement should be accomplished . . . without adding to the categories of properties and institutions enjoying special tax privileges . . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b). Congress did, however, provide for an exemption from real property taxation for lands conveyed under the act. The exemption was limited in time to 20 years, and in content to lands “which are not developed or leased to third parties.” 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1). This case concerns the meaning of the term “developed” in the act.
Following a hearing, the borough assessor rejected Tyonek’s claim of exemption on the grounds that although the property was no longer leased it was developed. Tyonek appealed this determination to the superior court. The superior court decided that the parcel was exempt, stating: “It is clear that [Tyonek] is entitled to a moratorium on taxation so long as the property lies unleased or otherwise unproductive and idle.” From this decision the borough appeals.
We thus REVERSE that portion of the superior court�s ruling which held that ownership in UIC is not a ground for challenge for cause under Civil Rule 47(c)(12). The motion to change venue is REMANDED to the superior court for redetermination in light of the views expressed herein.[2]
Swiss has received a conveyance of a primary place of business site. This was his guiding campsite at Cathedral Creek. He has also had a tract near Fan Creek conveyed to him as a subsistence campsite. In this case, Swiss ultimately came to claim that he was entitled to conveyance of the Black Lake camp as another subsistence campsite.[1]
In the cross motions for partial summary judgment, the court is asked to determine the distribution requirements of § 7(j) of ANCSA. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j). Section 1606(j) requires a Regional Corporation to make certain cash distributions to Village Corporations and to region at-large stock-holders.
Layered subsidiary structures became the norm.
Communication increasingly emphasized financial outcomes over governance explanation.
This dispute arises under the Alaska Natives Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”). See 43 U.S.C. § 1601-1629e (1988); Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 1477, 1491 (D. Alaska 1985), aff’d, 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986). In passing this legislation, Congress declared as a national policy that “there is an immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska,” and that “settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation … .” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a), (b).“
Dividends became the most visible indicator of corporate success.
Congress included in ANCSA a number of provisions designed to protect the rights of those who have valid existing rights to land subject to conveyance under the Act. Thus conveyances to Native corporations must be made subject to the provisions of existing leases, contracts and permits. ANCSA § 14(g), 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g). Those who have made prior lawful entries for the purpose of gaining title to a homestead, a headquarters site, a trade and manufacturing site, or a small tract site are protected and entitled to a patent when they meet the requirements of the law under which they enter. ANCSA § 22(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1621(b). Similarly, those who have prior valid mining claims and locations are protected. ANCSA § 22(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1621 (c). In addition, there are provisions which require conveyances to individuals or organizations on the basis of their occupancy for a particular purpose rather than the presence of a valid existing right or a lawful entry under the public land laws. This case involves the interpretation of two such provisions, sections 14(c)(1) and (2).[1] See 43 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(1) & (2).
In 1980, for the purpose of enhancing the quantity and quality of renewable resources and to facilitate land management in Alaska with respect to federal, state, and Native lands, Congress created the Alaska Land Bank Program. 43 U.S.C. § 1636. On specified terms and conditions, private property, such as that owned by Settlement Act corporations, might be made subject to the program; and, if they were, certain benefits flowed to the private land-owners, amongst which was immunity from judgments. 43 U.S.C. § 1636(c)(2)(C) (1980). In 1988, Congress revisited the benefits portion of the Alaska Land Bank Program, enacting a new subsection 1636(d), which provided in pertinent part:
It is undisputed that the Girl Scouts did not occupy the lands in question at the time Cape Fox received its patent in 1979. Cape Fox argues that this renders the Girl Scouts ineligible for a reconveyance. The Girl Scouts filed the current complaint in May 1993.
In 1992, Shee Atika brought this action, seeking a declaration that it has a right to use rock, sand, and gravel from Sealaska’s subsurface estate without paying Sealaska. Sealaska counterclaimed, requesting a permanent injunction prohibiting Shee Atika and those harvesting its timber from taking rock, sand, and gravel without Sealaska’s consent.
Boards increasingly adopted standard corporate governance practices.
Audit, compliance, and internal controls became more formalized.
Congress enacted ANCSA in 1971. The Act is a legislative compromise, written in response to conflicts among the federal government, the state of Alaska, Alaska Natives and non-Native settlers over ownership of Alaskan lands. It awarded Alaska Natives $ 962.5 million and approximately 40 million acres of public land, in exchange for extinguishment of their aboriginal title claims. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605(a), 1611.
Governance literacy diverged sharply between corporate leadership and shareholders.
Village corporation may not discriminate between shareholders when distributing corporate assets
The appellant (“Eklutna”) appeals an administrative hearing officer’s final administrative decision regarding a tax assessment against property owned by Eklutna. The hearing officer determined that the subject property was not entitled to a tax exemption under federal law. The property is a large lot located in downtown Anchorage. Eklutna received the property in a 1988 land exchange with the state, and Eklutna then sold the property to Knakanen (a wholly owned subsidiary of Eklutna’s). In 1994, Knakanen subdivided the property from one lot (Lot 1A, Block 112A) into two lots, 2A and 2B. Eklutna (which now owns the property after dissolution of Knakanen) leases Lot 2A, but claimed that Lot 2B is exempt from taxes because it is owned by a native corporation and it is not developed as per 43 U.S.C. 1620(d), or because it is a “remainder” parcel under 43 U.S.C. 1636(d).
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”), Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 668 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629f), is a complex piece of legislation that fundamentally altered land rights in Alaska. The Act sought to achieve “a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims.” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a). Several years of hearings and detailed studies commissioned by Congress preceded the enactment of the ANCSA. See, e.g., Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, Alaska Natives and the Land (1968). Reports accompanying the final bills in the House and Senate indicate that Congress believed it had struck a fair balance among the competing interests. See S. Rep. No. 92-405, at 85-86 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 92-523, at 4-6 (1971). The Act was well received by the major groups that stood to benefit from it, including the Alaskan Natives. See, e.g., Robert D. Arnold, Alaska Native Land Claims at v, 145-46 (1976).
Financial success dampened appetite for governance reform.
We reverse the district court's judgment invalidating the permit and enjoining use of the log transfer facility. We affirm in all other respects.
Lands covered by ANCSA § 14(f) village consent requirement for subsurface development
Enacted in 1971, ANCSA granted Alaskan Natives approximately 44 million acres of land and $ 1 billion in exchange for the extinguishment of aboriginal title to land in Alaska. The Act created twelve Regional Corporations, organized under Alaska Law, to take title to most of the land and all of the money. The Act also created more than 200 “Village Corporations,” each within one region, which took title to 22 million acres of surface estate. All of the stock in the Regional and Village corporations is owned by the approximately 70,000 Alaska Natives; residents of a given Village own stock in that Village Corporation and in the corresponding Regional Corporation, while Natives like Oliver who do not reside in a Village own at-large shares of their Regional Corporation. Through inheritance, Oliver owns shares in two Regional Corporations.
Public Law 105-276 (HR 4194), Oct 21, 1998
Public Law 105-333 (HR 2000), October 31, 1998
Application of due process to village corporation processing of claims for reconveyances under section 14(c)
Oil Pollution Act authorized the assertion of the federal government's private claims for Native corporations' lost use of selected but unconveyed lands.
Village corporation having joint venture with stevedoring company did not make discriminatory distributions of corporate wealth or dividends when it distributed longshoring opportunities among shareholders and partially paid travel subsidies to longshore workers traveling from village to work site.
Koniag argues that the April 1997 letter was a proxy statement because it was a communication made during the execution of Defendants� continuous plan, which ended in a proxy vote solicitation.
Salamatof seeks dismissal pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1632(b). Docket Nos. 15 & 21. Salamatof contends that Ogle failed to commence this action within one year of the filing of the map of boundaries, and thereby lost his right to sue. Id. The motion is opposed. Docket No. 18. Ogle argues that he was not given sufficient notice of Salamatof’s actions regarding his claim to satisfy due process. Id. Both parties request oral argument. Docket Nos. 22 & 23. However, the record has been fully developed and oral argument would not be helpful. D. Ak. LR 7.1(i); see United States v. Cheely, 814 F. Supp. 1430, 1436 n.2 (D. Alaska 1992).
ANCSA corporations became fully recognized as long-term corporate institutions.
Shareholders began organizing to challenge board decisions and governance norms.
Congress enacted ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., in 1971 “to achieve a fair and just settlement of all aboriginal land [in Alaska] . . . with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property.” 43 U.S.C. § 1601 note (Supp. 1995) (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy for ANCSA Amendments of 1987). To accomplish this goal, ANCSA created regional corporations to hold and manage the Native land settlements. Congress amended ANCSA in 1987 to ensure the continuing success of the Native corporations. The amendments included a provision permitting a corporation to create a “settlement trust,” a vehicle into which a corporation could transfer assets that were to be used for the health, education, and welfare of the trust beneficiaries. Assets held in these trusts enjoy protection from the corporation’s creditors.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (Dec. 18, 1971), codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), extinguished all claims of aboriginal title in Alaska. ANCSA divided Alaska into twelve geographic regions and established a native-owned Regional Corporation for each. ANCSA also established about 220 Village Corporations, one for each native village entitled to receive land and funds under ANCSA. Then ANCSA gave the Village Corporations the surface estates of about 22 million acres of land. ANCSA gave the Regional Corporations 16 million acres of land in fee as well as the subsurface estates and timber rights for the 22 million acres of the Village Corporations. Bay View is a Village Corporation.
Proxy statement by shareholders opposing shareholder approval of settlement trust contained materially false or misleading statements. Limited authority to amend trust does not grant board authority to amend terms of trust "as they see fit." Since board has exclusive statutory authority to appoint trustees, it is untrue that trust agreement irrevocably delegates appoint authority from the shareholders. Receipt of proxy statement with trust agreement does not neutralize misrepresentations.
Native claims for trespass prior to ANCSA were extinguished because ANCSA § 4 extinguished not only Aboriginal title to all Alaska Natives, but also all claims based on aboriginal title in the sense that the past or present existence of aboriginal title is an element of the claim.
Public Law 106-259, 114 Stat. 656, August 17, 2000
Public Law 106–559, Dec. 21, 2000
Proxy contests emerged as the main mechanism for shareholder challenge.
Counsel: David C. Crosby, Juneau, Alaska; Bruce E. Gagnon, Atkinson, Conway & Gagnon, Inc., Anchorage, Alaska; James D. Linxwiler, Guess & Rudd, PC, Anchorage, Alaska, for appellants.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to material facts and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to material fact.[2] The moving party need not present evidence; it need only point out the lack of any genuine dispute as to material fact.[3] Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.[4] All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed for purposes summary judgment, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant.[5] However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a fact-finer to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.[6]
Urban corporation may issue a benefit, in the form of elders shares, to original shareholders whether or not they are current shareholders.
Excerpts relating to settlement trust taxation.
Public Law 107-16 (HR 1836), June 2001
Courts increasingly became venues for resolving internal corporate disputes.
Where shareholders filed derivative suit without making a pre-suit demand and without excuse for making a pre-suit demand, and corporation took remedial steps so suit became moot, suit can be dismissed and shareholders may be prohibited from recovering litigation expenses.
Calls for independent directors gained traction as a governance reform idea.
Harvey A. Levin argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees Chugach Management Services Joint Venture, et al.
Proxy information provided by corporation in connection seeking shareholder approval of settlement trust was not materially misleading. Shareholders alleged that it was materially misleading for corporation to state that shareholders could vote on amendments without stating that any amendment needed to be approved by the trustees. Statements or omissions qualify as misrepresentations when they are misleading or false, and a misleading or false statement is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. Materiality of a particular omission needs to be evaluated in light of the totality of information available to shareholders.
Public Law 108–7, Feb. 20, 2003
Public Law 108-129, Nov. 17, 2003
Shareholders increasingly framed transparency as essential to trust.
Perceptions of board entrenchment gained traction among shareholders.
Settlement among Native corporation and dissenting shareholders that provided for shareholders to transfer shares of Native corporation's shares back to corporation in exchange for shares in a new corporation was unenforceable because it contravened inalienability provisions of ANCSA § 7(h)(1)(B).
D.W. NELSON, TASHIMA, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Senate Report 109-112 - July 28, 2005
Reform efforts were increasingly characterized as destabilizing rather than constructive.
Village corporation may not redeem shares as part of litigation settlement with shareholders.
The Alaska area director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had determined initially that all eleven villages were eligible under ANCSA but on administrative appeal the Secretary of the Interior ruled to the contrary. Granting summary judgment to the villages[1] the District Court vacated the Secretary’s determinations and ordered the BIA decisions reinstated. Koniag, Inc. v. Kleppe, 405 F. Supp. 1360 (D.D.C. 1975). The District Court did so in four of the cases on the ground that the BIA decisions had been appealed to the Secretary by a party without standing to do so; the appeals were therefore unauthorized and invalid, and under Department of the Interior regulations, the BIA decision, if unappealed, constituted the final decision of the Secretary. In the other seven cases, the court held the procedure followed to determine the appeals failed to comply with due process and further, that congressional interference had infected the determinations. The court ordered the BIA decisions reinstated in these seven cases because the effects of the congressional interference lingered and the BIA decisions were the last untainted decisions of the Secretary’s delegate.
"ELEANOR V. BODKIN and MARIA D. L. COLEMAN, Appellants, v. COOK INLET REGION, INC., Appellee."
S. 449 - March 13, 2006
Repeated cycles of challenge and limited change led to shareholder disengagement.
U.S. District Court decision dismissing challenge to eligibility of Leisnoi as a village corporation under section 11(b)(3) due to Congressional action recognizing the village.
R. Collin Middleton, Anchorage, Alaska, for defendant-appellee Koniag, Inc.
The 2008 financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities and tested risk management across ANCSA corporations.
Boards increasingly prioritized risk mitigation and capital preservation.
On January 17, 1969, the United States issued Public Land Order (“PLO”) 4582, which withdrew all unreserved public lands in Alaska and reserved them under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior for determination. PLO 4582 was modified on December 8, 1970 to extend the withdrawal period for lands subject to PLO 4582 through September 30, 1971. Shortly after the end of the withdrawal period, on December 18, 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.[1] ANCSA was enacted to provide a fair and just settlement of all aboriginal land claims in Alaska. Pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1611(a), Ahtna, one of the Regional Corporations created pursuant to ANCSA for the benefit of Alaska Natives, received title to the Lot from the United States on October 23, 1981 by Interim Conveyance No. 443 (“I.C. 443”). On July 26, 1983, Johnson and Williams submitted an application to Ahtna seeking reconveyance of the Lot pursuant to ANCSA § 14(c)(1) (43 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(1)), which Ahtna denied on March 1, 1990 on the ground that BLM had rejected their headquarters site application which rendered them trespassers subject to the judicial interpretation of § 14(c)(1) precluding failed land entrants and trespassers from claiming a right to ANCSA lands.[2]
Reciprocal sand and gravel rights of village and regional corporations
Corporations increasingly relied on debt, credit, and complex financing structures.
KIC is a Native Village Corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (ANCSA). As with other native corporations organized under ANCSA, KIC’s shares were originally distributed only to persons of Alaska Native descent. Although ANCSA imposes limits on transfer of corporate shares to non-Alaska Natives, there are no restrictions on who may receive shares through inheritance. No evidence has thus far been presented to show how many of KIC’s shareholders have a non-Alaska Native racial background.
Shareholder preference for NANA shareholders does not violate state or federal anti-discrimination law
Reaffirming that shareholder hiring preference does not violate Civil Rights laws
Village corporation failure to provide annual reports and hold annual meetings; board of directors fiduciary duties.
14(c)(1) site does not include airstrip to access 14(c)(1) site; airstrips are to be conveyed to governmental body under 14(c)(4)
Business activities became increasingly disconnected from shareholders’ daily lives.
Henrichs et al. vs. Chugach Alaska Corporation
Federal District Court does not have jurisdiction to decide merits of 14(c) application before the Village corporation has made a decision on the 14(c) application, but the applicant may be able to obtain mandamus to compel the Village corporation to make a decision
Digital tools increased access to information—but not necessarily understanding.
Alleged violation of antifraud provision of state securities law, which was incorporated into ANCSA regarding shareholder petition to lift alienability restrictions, raised federal question and therefore was within federal court jurisdiction.
Superior Court for the State of Alaska (2012) Case No. 1PE-09-76 CI
Numerous defects in dissident shareholders’ proxy solicitation justified voiding proxies; CIRI not required to facilitate dissident solicitation; management authority of board vs. shareholders, and other matters.
Audit, compliance, and legal functions grew in scope and influence.
BLM waiver of administration may transfer administration of perpetual material site right-of-way grant to Native corporation that received conveyance of the affected land (not decided), but under terms of grant Native corporation did not have authority to terminate grant without state�s consent.
ANCSA does not deprive Secretary of Interior of authority to take Alaska land into trust on behalf of Alaska Natives and tribes.
Shareholders increasingly perceived executives and boards as insulated from feedback.
Pederson v. Arctic Slope Regional Corporation
Cannot cumulate votes when a candidate withdraws if proxy does not provide that authority; corporation may hold annual meetings in Washington; and other matters
Financial performance metrics became the primary measure of success.
“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)) (alteration in original). A court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the deference the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S. Ct. 897, 74 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1983).
Stakeholders increasingly expected real-time access to information and explanations.
Here, AS 13.06.065 establishes the probate jurisdiction of the superior court, while AS 13.16.705 specifically addresses testamentary transfers of Native corporation stock. Under AS 13.06.065, the court has jurisdiction over “estates of decedents, including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors.” Petitioners claim this provision authorizes the court to admit Mr. Totemoff’s stock will to probate. But AS 13.16.705 provides that the “common stock or other alienable stock” of a Native Corporation is not “subject to probate” and may not be considered “in determining the value of an estate or allowance.” Thus, the statutory language suggests that Mr. Totemoff’s Chugach Alaska stock is not part of the estate. If the stock is not part of the estate, it does not fall within the Court’s probate jurisdiction, which extends only to “estates of decedents.”[2]
Amended regulations, including announcement (February 23, 2016) made structural changes that shaped long-term ANCSA corporate governance.
Worker classification, wage practices, and employment standards drew heightened attention.
ANCSA corporations were increasingly compared to publicly traded companies.
Jesse A. KATAIROAK Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION, Appellee. Jesse A. Katairoak Sr., Appellant, v. State of Alaska, Department of Revenue, Child Support Services Division, Appellee.
Disputes that once remained internal became public and persistent.
Employees increasingly expected voice, protection, and responsiveness.
Pursuant to AS 45.55.139, ANCSA corporations with 500 or more shareholders and total assets exceeding $1,000,000 must file with the Administrator all annual reports, proxies, consents or authorizations, proxy statements, or other proxy solicitations distributed and made available by any person to 30 or more Alaska resident shareholders concurrently with distribution of those materials to shareholders.
Williams v. Bristol Bay Native Corporation
Stakeholders wanted explanations—not just numbers.
Tension between legacy structures and modern expectations became difficult to ignore.
Stakeholders increasingly called for modernization without shared definitions.
Shareholder letter to the editor, published several months before any director candidates were announced or any election-related materials were distributed to shareholders, complaining about corporation's proxy voting procedures was not a solicitation of a proxy that had to be filed with the Division of Banking and Securities.
The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted operations, communication, and governance practices across ANCSA corporations.
Labor practices and worker classification became focal points of scrutiny.
Online platforms enabled faster, broader coordination of stakeholder concerns.
Native corporation may be able to refuse to seat winning director candidate who refused to sign confidentiality agreement and code of conduct; issue was not ripe in the case.
The Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor, held that while ANCs are not federally recognized tribes in a sovereign political sense, they are “Indian tribes” under plain definition in Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), and thus, they are eligible to receive monetary relief under the CARES Act.
Stakeholders increasingly questioned not just outcomes, but the legitimacy of decision-making processes.
Stakeholders became more aware of regulatory frameworks and oversight mechanisms.
ANCSA 7(h)(1)(A)(i) does not impose a requirement to hold annual shareholder meetings based on the release of financial reports; entitle a shareholder to automatically or routinely receive dividends without a dividend declaration by the board of directors; and does not incorporate Alaska corporate law to make garden-variety state law claims subject to federal question jurisdiction. Salaries and fees paid to corporation's officers and directors are not "illegal preferred stock" such that payment violates equal treatment rule for payment of dividends. The Small Business Act does not create a private right of action to force Native corporation to pay dividends.
ANCSA retroactively extinguished aboriginal land title when there had been a conveyance prior to ANCSA. So, prior aboriginal ownership of land did not prevent the State of Alaska from acquiring a right of way under R.S. 2477 over �public land.� R.S. 2477 right of aways are limited to �highway purposes,� which is broader than mere ingress and egress but does require a connection to facilitating highway transportation.
Mr. Daniels was employed by Chugach’s Washington, D.C. office as an IT professional. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Mr. Daniels’ employment with Chugach began in 2009 as a Systems Administrator. Id. At this time, Mr. Daniels was in his mid-fifties. The Lead Systems Administrator was an Ethiopian male in his sixties. Id. In 2011, Chugach announced a reorganization, including the consolidation of Mr. Daniels’ position with the Lead Systems Administrator position. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Daniels and his Ethiopian colleague applied for the new position, but Chugach hired a younger Caucasian male. Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Daniels alleges that the new hire did not possess the relevant education or work experience requirements that were posted in the job description. Id. ¶ 7.
Purpose of shareholder request to inspect records must be derived from the totality of the written request. Suspecting �shenanigans� may be sufficient proper purpose. So is auditing executive compensation.
The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. Seldovia Native Association, Inc.’s (“plaintiff’s”), claims arise out of a series of complicated actions in the mid-1970s aimed at clarifying and resolving aboriginal land claims in Alaska. In 1971 Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1994) (the “ANCSA”). Unresolved native claims had clouded Alaska’s authority to lease lands and transfer rights regarding petroleum resources and had hindered development of the Alaskan Pipeline. Congress intended the ANCSA to provide a “fair and just settlement of all claims . . . rapidly, with certainty, [and] in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives.” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a), (b). While the ANCSA did not explicitly acknowledge the existence of prior aboriginal rights, it did expressly extinguish “all aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and occupancy.” 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b). Furthermore, because “all prior conveyances of public land . . . pursuant to Federal law, and all tentative approvals pursuant to section 6(g) of the Alaska Statehood Act,” 72 Stat. 339 (1958), were to extinguish all claims of aboriginal title, the ANCSA envisioned that land owners or users, as well as potential developers, would be free to build property without the uncertainty that potential aboriginal claims created. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
Internal reporting mechanisms faced scrutiny for credibility and protection.
The absence of accessible governance education became increasingly visible.
In October 2019, Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant as an Aviation Security Officer. Dkt. No. 1. Defendant is a subsidiary of Akima, LLC which in turn is owned by NANA Regional Corporation, an Alaska Native Corporation. See Dkt. No. 5. In February 2022, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. Id. The EEOC dismissed the charge citing jurisdictional limitations over cases involving private membership clubs or tribal entities. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7.
Modernization discussions increasingly emphasized stability and risk reduction.
Independent educational efforts emerged to raise governance literacy.
Long-standing structural tensions are no longer episodic—they are persistent.
ANCSA now functions as a permanent governance and economic system, not a transitional settlement.
ANCSA’s promise of finality did not include built-in mechanisms for periodic recalibration.
State corporate law now carries responsibilities it was never designed to hold.
Meaningful shareholder participation requires translation, not just access.
Information availability alone does not create trust.
Modern labor expectations challenge legacy subsidiary and classification models.
Internal reporting systems now function as stability mechanisms.
Governance literacy is now a structural requirement.
Modernization conversations increasingly center on institutional resilience.
PUBLIC LAW 119–23, July 7, 2025
Public Law 119-22, July 7, 2025
The future hinges on whether ANCSA’s system can learn without crisis.
Internal Revenue Code: 26 U.S.C. § 646
§ 10.06.433 | § 10.06.960 | § 10.06.961 | § 10.20.007
§ 13.12.102 | § 13.16.705 | § 13.46.085 | § 22.10.025
§ 43.80.015. Revenue and Taxation; Taxation under P.L. 92 - 203
§ 38.05.073 | § 38.95.050 | § 41.17.900 | § 41.21.025 | § 41.21.302 | § 44.47.150
§ 18.56.097 | § 18.56.460
§ 13.26.344 | § 34.45.760 | § 45.50.572 | § 46.03.822 | § 47.08.060 | § 47.55.020
3 AAC 08.305 | 3 AAC 08.307 | 3 AAC 08.312 | 3 AAC 08.315 | 3 AAC 08.325 | 3 AAC 08.335 | 3 AAC 08.345 | 3 AAC 08.355 | 3 AAC 08.360 | 3 AAC 08.365
Alaska Regulations Relating to Municipal Trust Land became a key legal reference point for ANCSA-era governance and accountability.
Request for investigation of Alaska Native corporation proxy solicitation became a key legal reference point for ANCSA-era governance and accountability.
3 AAC 08.360
Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement became a key legal reference point for ANCSA-era governance and accountability.
This case presents a number of complex issues involving questions of waiver and whether the superior court’s 1995 judgment was void or voidable. We conclude that Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment. We conclude that the Arbitration Panel’s fee award and the superior court’s 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. § 1621(a)‘s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act. We conclude that the superior court’s 2010 order granting Merdes’s motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act’s prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts, and that order is reversed. We conclude that, notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi is not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b): We conclude that the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4); we also conclude that Leisnoi is not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes must return Leisnoi’s payment of the $643,760 balance on the judgment, with interest, but Leisnoi is not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. Merdes may file an action for any fees it believes it is entitled to under a theory of quantum meruit.