In January 1980, the Forest Service transferred administration of the special use permits to Kavilco pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g). Kavilco chose to administer the permits by sending new lease agreements to the permittees. These lease agreements increased the permittees’ rent. Buettner and Hamar refused to sign the new leases and instead sent Kavilco checks for the amounts required by the special use permits. Kavilco rejected the checks and unsuccessfully attempted forcible entry and detainer proceedings against Buettner and Hamar. On January 25, 1983, Buettner and Hamar commenced a quiet title action in Alaska state court. Kavilco removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kavilco. Buettner and Hamar appeal.
This appeal arises out of what the district court perceived as a tension between two subsections of ANCSA § 1613. Buettner and Hamar rely on ANCSA § 1613(c)(1), which provides:Each patent issued pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be subject to the requirements of this subsection. Upon receipt of a patent or patents:(1) the Village Corporation shall first convey to any Native or non-Native occupant, without consideration, title to the surface estate in the tract occupied as of December 18, 1971 . . . as a primary place of residence, or as a primary place of business, or as a subsistence campsite, or as a headquarters for reindeer husbandry.
Defines where disputes must be litigated (state vs. federal), which affects cost, leverage, and practical enforceability for shareholders.