U.S. District Court decision dismissing challenge to eligibility of Leisnoi as a village corporation under section 11(b)(3) due to Congressional action recognizing the village.
In 1976, Omar Stratman (Stratman), a rancher with grazing leases in the area from which Leisnoi was entitled to select its land, sued in Federal court challenging Leisnoi’s status as a Native village eligible for ANCSA benefits. Stratman had not pursued his administrative remedies. The district court dismissed his action, concluding he lacked standing. In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that Stratman had standing based on his recreational interest, and reinstated Stratman’s claim. The court also excused Stratman’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies because, as a lessor, he was entitled to, but did not, receive actual notice of Leisnoi’s entitlement to the land.In 1982, Stratman entered an agreement with Koniag, with which Leisnoi had merged, to drop his litigation challenging Leisnoi’s eligibility. The agreement failed, however, after Leisnoi’s merger with Koniag was voided and Leisnoi repudiated the agreement in 1985. In 1994, the Ninth Circuit ordered Stratman’s challenge to Leisnoi’s eligibility reinstated.In 1995, the district court stayed the litigation. Noting that this appears to be the perfect case to read ripeness and primary jurisdiction together to require that Stratman litigate his challenge to Leisnoi before the agency before he brings it here, the court sent the case to IBLA for consideration of Stratman’s challenge to Leisnoi. The court explained that [remand would] permit the exhaustion of administrative remedies, albeit belated, and give the Court the benefit of the agency’s expertise…
Adds precedent that influences how ANCSA corporations, regulators, and shareholders interpret governance rights and remedies.