This dispute arises under the Alaska Natives Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”). See 43 U.S.C. § 1601-1629e (1988); Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 1477, 1491 (D. Alaska 1985), aff’d, 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986). In passing this legislation, Congress declared as a national policy that “there is an immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska,” and that “settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation … .” 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a), (b).“
In consideration of constitutional due process limitations, the following procedure appears to be the most suitable for resolving disputes over conveyances under Section 14(c)(3). The municipal corporation is required to present a request for specific land. The parties will then negotiate with each other and, if no agreement can be reached the village will determine its best and final offer. That offer will be rendered in the form of a map, which, when filed, will initiate the one-year statutory limitations period. See 43 U.S.C. § 1632(b). The municipality then can bring suit. The Court will apply the statutory criteria to the competing proposals and decide which parcels of land should be conveyed.In deciding not to follow the procedure offered by Judge Kleinfeld, the Court is aware that the doctrine of the law of the case limits reexamination of previous rulings in the same case. Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d. 993, 996, amended, 860 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1473 (1992); Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 269, 272 (D. Alaska 1990), aff’d, 967 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 964 (1993). However, under certain circumstances, prior determinations that have become the law of the case may be reexamined. In Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit stated:A court properly exercises its discretion to reconsider an issue in only three instances: (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice; (2) an intervening change in the law has occurred; or (3) the evidence on remand is substantially different.
Adds precedent that influences how ANCSA corporations, regulators, and shareholders interpret governance rights and remedies.