KIC is a Native Village Corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (ANCSA). As with other native corporations organized under ANCSA, KIC’s shares were originally distributed only to persons of Alaska Native descent. Although ANCSA imposes limits on transfer of corporate shares to non-Alaska Natives, there are no restrictions on who may receive shares through inheritance. No evidence has thus far been presented to show how many of KIC’s shareholders have a non-Alaska Native racial background.
In opposition, Becker cites Aleman v. Chugach Support Services, Inc., 485 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2007), in which the Fourth Circuit refused to extend the same implicit exemption to Alaska Native corporations, even while it held that Indian tribes were exempt because “the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes ‘is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance[.]'”[38] Given the circuit split on this issue, the Court is left to determine for itself whether entities exempt from Title VII employment discrimination suits should be likewise immune under §1981.In interpreting a statute, the Court must first look at its plain language.[39] On its face, § 1981 contains no exemption for Alaska Native corporations. However, the Supreme Court has held that “‘[i]f a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.'”[40] Thus, the Court may read a Native corporation exemption into § 1981 if and only if any other reading would be absurd. The Aleman court held that it would not be absurd for Congress to differentiate between Title VII and § 1981 with regard to Native corporation immunity:We find nothing implausible about Congress’ enacting overlapping causes of action or deciding that Alaska Native Corporations should be exempt from suit under Title VII, but not Section 1981. While both Section 1981 and Title VII provide remedies against racial discrimination, Title VII imposes obligations that are in some ways more expansive. To take the most obvious example, Title VII addresses not simply discrimination based upon race or color but also discrimination based upon “religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). A legislature could easily desire to subject only certain entities to the additional strictures of Title VII, while leaving in place the more limited cause of action in Section 1981 that has long been a part of our anti-discrimination law.[41]
Adds precedent that influences how ANCSA corporations, regulators, and shareholders interpret governance rights and remedies.