Application of due process to village corporation processing of claims for reconveyances under section 14(c)
In their briefs, neither party provides the Court with a map detailing the relationship between the land to which Ogle asserts his reconveyance rights and the primary location of Salamatof Native Association. Where the land in issue is in the vicinity of the village and all claimants use the village as a base of operations to get mail and supplies and travel to and from the outside, notice posted in the post office or general store may be sufficient if it is coupled with personal notice to those known to the village members. When the land in question may have no historical or geographical connection with the village, and claimants may have no reason to regularly visit the village, notices posted in the village may have no likelihood of reaching claimants. By the same token, claimants might not associate the land they claim with a village which might be far away. Of course, where the village has no past association with or even easy access to the land affected, its burden of discovering potential claimants and giving them notice is increased.Congress is generally under no obligation to create a property right in any private individual or group. Where, however, Congress creates rights, as it did in the case of 14(c) claimants, the government must make reasonable efforts to alert the possessor of such rights to the risk of loss. The administration of Native land claims is a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the government. When Congress and the Secretary delegated to Salamatof initial responsibility to resolve section 14(c) claims, it became an instrument of the federal government, obligated under the Fifth Amendment to give adequate notice before depriving anyone of his or her property rights. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974), reh’g denied, 417 U.S. 977, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1148, 94 S. Ct. 3187 (1974); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985); McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 1989);Dorr v. Butte County, 795 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1986).In Loudermill, the Court stated:The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights — life, liberty, and property — cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. . . . The right to due process ‘is conferred not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest . . . it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.’
Adds precedent that influences how ANCSA corporations, regulators, and shareholders interpret governance rights and remedies.